Over the past ten years, researchers studying the structure of discourse have consistently had to face questions such as the following: Given that discourses consist of segments, how do the segments relate? What intersegment relations are there? How many are needed? A fair amount o f c o n troversy exists, ranging from the parsimonious position (that two basic relations suce) to the proigate position (that an open-ended set of semantic/rhetorical relations is required). This paper outlines the arguments and then summarizes a survey of the conclusions of approximately 30 researchers | from linguists to computational linguists to philosophers to Articial Intelligence workers. It fuses and taxonomizes the more than 400 relations they have proposed into a hierarchy o f approximately 70 increasingly semantic relations, and argues that though the taxonomy is open-ended in one dimension, it is bounded in the other and therefore does not give rise to anarchy. Some evidence is provided for the organization of the taxonomy, a s w ell as a full listing of the sources. 
1 Intersegment Discourse Relations
The Problem: The Number of Relations
This paper proposes a resolution to a major dierence that has frequently surfaced among the various computationally oriented approaches toward the study of discourse. The question revolves around the number and organization of the intersegment relations that provide structure and coherence to discourse. These three approaches are: segmentation approaches that partition discourses into blocks that overlap or contain others using few intersegment relations (see, for example, [Grosz & Sidner 86 , Polanyi 88, K a m p 8 1 , Lascarides & Asher 91] ); schema-based approaches that use predened combinations of rhetorical predicates to represent the structure of stereotypical texts (for example, [McKeown 85, Paris 87 , R a m bow 9 0 ]); relation-based approaches that describe discourse structure as a tree of relations holding between adjacent b l o c ks of text [Hobbs 79, Mann & Thompson 88, Dahlgren 88] , which includes text planning work using communicative goals that activate so-called text plans that govern text structure (see [Hovy 88a , M o o r e 8 9 , M a ybury 90]).
In this paper we m a k e the following assumptions. A discourse (a spoken or written text) is a structured collection of clauses. The clauses are grouped on semantic and other grounds into segments; the nesting of segments to form larger segments provides the discourse structure. A discourse can be represented as a tree structure, in which e a c h node of the tree governs the segment (subtree) beneath it. At the top level, the discourse is governed by a single root node; at the leaves, the basic segments are single grammatical clauses. In every coherent discourse, juxtaposed segments are related depending on the underlying interrelationships and dependencies among their contents.
It has been argued fairly generally, on the one hand, that multisentence texts (specically, short texts such as paragraphs) are coherent b y virtue of the rhetorical or semantic relationships that hold between text segments (i.e., individual clauses or groups of clauses) | see, for example, [Aristotle, Grimes 75, Hobbs 79, Mann & Thompson 88] . In this view, a text is only coherent when the author aids the reader's inferential understanding processes by p r o viding clues, during the discourse, as to how the pieces of the text interrelate. Such clues are often cue words and phrases such as \in order to" (signalling a purpose for an action) or \then" (signalling the next entity i n some temporal or spatial sequence; see for example [Mann & Thompson 88] ); but they can also be shifts in tense and mode (such as in \She was gone. Had she been there, all would have been well"; see ), intonational patterns in spoken discourse (prosodic dierences at segment endings are described by [Hirschberg & Litman 87, Pierrehumbert & Hirschberg 87] ), and The discourse structure, which is signalled by s u c h clues, is usually represented as a treelike structure of segments, related by i n tersegment relations. What relations are there? Several approaches have been taken.
Approaching the problem of discourse structure from several intellectual subelds, various researchers have produced lists of intersegment relations | from philosophers (e.g., [Toulmin 58] ) to linguists (e.g., [Quirk & Greenbaum 73, Halliday 8 5 ] ) to computational linguists (e.g., [Hobbs 79, Mann & Thompson 88] ) to Articial Intelligence researchers (e.g., [Schank & Abelson 77, Moore 89, Dahlgren 88] ). Typically, their lists contain between ve and thirty relations, though the more detailed the work, the more relations tend to be identied. In this paper, we will call the position of these researchers, namely that (at least) tens of interclausal relations are required to describe the structure of English discourse, the .
On the other hand, some researchers, notably [Grosz & Sidner 86] , prefer not to identify a specic set of such relations. They argue that trying to identify the \correct" set is a doomed enterprise, because there no closed set; the closer you examine intersegment relationships, the more variability y ou encounter, until you nd yourself on the slippery slope toward the full complexity of semantics proper. Thus though they do not disagree with the idea of relationships between adjacent text segments provide meaning and enforce coherence, they object to the notion that some small set of relations can describe English discourse adequately. As a counterproposal, Grosz and Sidner avoid the semantic eects on the structure of discourse by dening two basic structural relations, and , which c a r r y i n tentional (that is, goal-oriented, plan-based) but no semantic import. They use these relations in their theory of the structure of discourse, according to which some pieces of the text are either subordinate to or on the same \level" as other pieces with respect to the interlocutors' intentions. We will call this position, namely that two i n tersegment relations suce to represent discourse structure, the .
From the point of view of text analysis, the Parsimonious approach seems satisfactory. Certainly one can analyze discourse using the two i n tentional relations. From the point of view of text generation, however, this approach is not sucient. For example, when generating the following two clauses the author needs to know which semantic interrelationship to express. While it is important t o know h o w the intentions behind the two clauses relate, it is the semantic relation of causality that provides the appropriate linking word and much of the structural/realizational information (had Comparing then the parsimonious and proigate positions, the following questions arise:
Does one really need semantic and/or rhetorical discourse structure relations to describe discourse structure? If so, which relations, and how m a n y, are there? How can one manage the problem of increasing semantic complexity?
Until these questions are resolved to the satisfaction of the adherents of both positions, eorts to integrate the work on discourse generation and analysis are liable to continue getting stranded. This paper suggests a compromise intended to facilitate further research.
Based on the text planning argument outlined above, we b e l i e v e that one cannot provide a sucient account of discourse structure without using semantic/rhetorical relations. The solution we p r o p o s e is to use just as many relations as are required for the task being done. As it stands, this is of course a nearly empty statement, but in the rest of the paper we p r o vide approximately 70 relations, organized into a hierarchy of increasing specicity. W e believe that these relations determine the major aspects of English discourse structure, and we h a ve organized them to allow straightforward extension in a constrained way when more detail is required.
In order to motivate our solution, an analogy to syntactic classes may be instructive. It is possible to represent the syntactic structure of any s e n tence by using only two relations: Immediate Dominance and Linear Precedence, as shown by the GPSG work on the ID/LP format for grammars [Gazdar et al. 85, Shieber 84] . On the other hand, it is also possible to represent the syntactic structure of any s e n tence using a set of highly detailed terms, even as detailed as the actual verb itself to govern the predicate. This approach i s a d v ocated by, for example, [Gross 84, M e l ' cuk & Zholkovsky 70] , who show that almost every verb is a class by itself, since almost every verb has in some aspect or other a unique predicate structure. Under their account, an adequate syntactic representation of any s e n tence requires the actual verb name itself rather than general terms such a s or .
verb, noun, adjective 2 Collecting Discourse Structure Relations On the one hand, then, the parsimonious position: just two relations, and very little information about the classes involved. On the other hand, the proigate position: numerous relations, and much information about the classes involved. While the parsimonious syntax trees are easy to construct, they are not very informative; and while the proigate tree are very informative, they are dicult to construct.
In practise, as with most things in life, most syntacticians compromise. They employ for syntactic descriptions a set of terms such a s , etc., that is neither as large as Mel' cuk and Zholkovsky or Gross would prefer, nor as small as used in the ID/ LP format; simultaneously the terms are not as informative as those Gross or Mel' cuk and Zholkovsy provide nor as stark as those of ID/LP. Where necessary for the task at hand, people use more (or less) detailed terms, suering the consequences of not being able to dene them precisely (or losing information, respectively).
The analogy to the question of discourse structure relations is direct. While the two structural relations of Grosz and Sidner provide as much information as one needs to build a tree, they not not convey the kind of information that a typical text generator requires, for example, to include appropriate structural cue words and phrases to guide the reader's inferences. On the other hand, as Grosz and Sidner say, if one attempts to describe the true semantic interrelationships among the various segments of the discourse, one is drawn into the quagmire of full semantic complexity, a n d as they show, such detail is not required for discussing discourse structure.
The solution is the compromise we propose here: a set of relations, organized into a taxonomy of specicity so that more detailed relations can be used (or invented) as needed. We next turn to the problem of nding the relations most useful to describe the structure of English discourse, and in Section 3 the problem of taxonomizing them.
To provide substance to our solution, the authors have collected intersegment relations that are expressive enough to satisfy the requirements of text planning systems while avoiding an unbounded ad hoc collection of semantic relations. In 1989, the rst author collected and taxonomized over 350 such relations from approximately 30 researchers in various elds; see [Hovy 90b ]. Subsequently, both authors found over 50 additional relations in other sources and produced an improved taxonomization, consisting of about 70 relations, reported in [Maier & Hovy 92 ]. This taxonomy is still being extended; see [Hovy et al. 92] . The relations are listed in the Appendix and the taxonomy i s reproduced in Section 3. Example:
Infer the same proposition P from the assertions of S0 and S1 (where S 0 and S1 stand for the two text segments linked b y t h e r elation).
One clause expands another by elaborating on it (or some portion of it), restating it in other words, specifying in it greater detail, commenting or exemplifying.
We do not wish to cast aspersions on any source; dening semantic relations is a very dicult problem. For example, nobody has provided a general denition of CAUSE, though causality has been the topic of centuries of debate. Even limited denitions, as required for the purposes of Articial Intelligence or Computational Linguistics in a particular application domain with a given ontology of terms, is dicult enough.
Deciding whether or not to merge two similar-looking relations from dierent sources is a task bedeviled by t wo factors: dierences in nomenclature and the frequent lack o f a n y explicit denition at all . The central problem lies in comparing denitions and/or examples. Since we cannot here describe all our decisions, we s h o w our treatment and own denitions of two example relations, and .
We compare several denitions and examples of relations which w ere labeled by the sources and check them for identity of meaning.
1. Go down First Street.
Just follow First Street down three blocks to A Street.
From the rst sentence the reader can infer that he/she has to go down First Street to an unspecied goal. The second sentence allows the same inferences except that the goal (\A Street") and the distance (\three blocks") are specied. There is a certain set of inferences which coincide for both sentences.
In this example the second sentence gives additional detail for the rst. But for Hobbs this does not necessarily have to be the case; his denition also includes an exact reformulation of the rst clause by the second. The Satellite [the clause of less importance] presents additional detail about the situation or some element of the subject matter which is presented in the Nucleus, or is inferentially accessible from the Nucleus, in one or more of the ways listed b elow:
abstract -instance set -member whole -part object -attribute generalization -specic
One clause gives details about or describes a part of a larger event reported in the other clause.
One text segment expands on the other by specifying it in greater detail or specifying it in other words, according to one of the following ways:
set-member process-step part-whole object-attribute abstract-instance general-specic restatement 2. He ran away.
Halliday's denition, which is restricted to linking simple clauses, explicitly allows both for relations that simply restate and for relations that provide more detail. That way, Halliday already gives a hint that the relation can be subclassied into various subcategories.
Besides the fact that this relation is the most detailed we h a ve encountered so far | it specializes into ve subclasses | it does not, like the denitions of Hobbs and Halliday, explicitly include restatements; for this function Mann and Thompson dene a separate relation .
Being limited to events, Dahlgren's denition is narrower, specifying under a subset of the phenomena included by Mann and Thompson.
The denitions reproduced here are representative of those for elaborations (and somewhat more explicit than most sources' descriptions). As is clear, the sources have a common understanding of the semantics of this relation. For , w e base our denition on the above o n e s t o g e t : Infer P from the assertion S0 and not-P from the assertion S1.
The Relator [the discourse structure r elation] implies that S2 is not [an] expected c onsequence of S1.
A qualication denies one of the implications of the event or state expressed by the other clause. The main clause in the relation qualies the \though" clause.
In this subsection we merge several sources' relations, all with dierent labels, into into one relation.
1. The paper is weak, 2. but it is interesting. O n e o f t h e t e x t s e gments raises expectations which are c ontradicted / violated by the other. any required Similarly, there is no guarantee that the terms , etc. are the \right" and \only" labels for types of words; they have simply been canonized by l o n g u s e a n d m uch experience. Other groupings appear in other languages, such as in languages that make no syntactic or morphological distinction between nouns and adjectives.
basic order: indicating a preferred sequence for the text segments; polarity: indicating whether one of the segments is negative o r n o t .
Their relation is dened as follows:
1. Although it is not exactly shouted from the rooftops, 2. you will have t o t a k e i n to account that sharks may occur along the Yugoslavian coast.
From these and similar denitions, we create the relation, dened as:
A question that is always asked of this work: What guarantee exists that the relations collected and merged here are indeed the \right" ones? Or the only ones? It is not dicult to come up with relations that dier in some way from those in the Appendix and that do not neatly fall under a single item in the taxonomy s h o wn in the next section.
This is a standard objection to set of terms proposed to fulll some function. The standard response holds here too: there is no guarantee that these are the \right" relations, whatever \right" may mean . As has been mentioned before, there is mounting evidence from actual attempts at constructing working systems (text planners and discourse analyzers) that intersegment relations of this type are to guide inference and planning processes. Without such relations programs simply cannot construct an adequate account of the structure of a discourse nor plan an adequate multisentence paragraph.
The particular relations proposed here are certainly open to question, but their strongest support is that they are the amalgamation and synthesis of the eorts and proposed terms of over 30 dierent investigations from dierent elds. There is always the possibility that new interclausal relations will be needed that cannot be subsumed under existing nodes in the taxonomy, though we believe 3 Organizing the Relations this to be unlikely, based on our experience in compiling the hierarchy: halfway through this study, the topmost tiers had essentially been established, and almost all new relations found were simply specializations of existing ones. We expect that when new domains are investigated, the hierarchy will grow primarily at the bottom, and that the ratio of the number of relations added at one level to the number of relations added at the next lower level will be low, for all levels.
The relations we h a ve collected are listed in the Appendix. We next turn to the question of taxonomizing them.
Given the semantic overlaps of many of the relations, it was soon clear that they could be taxonomized somehow. The most informative taxonomization was a two-dimensional hierarchic organization by increasing semantic specicity, with one dimension constrained in the number of relations and the other unconstrained (thus the more general a relation is, the higher it is in the hierarchy; while the more a relation is specied to distinguish it from others, the more its semantics are enhanced | since increasing specication invariably introduces additional semantic features; that is the nature of the specialization process | and the lower it appears in the hierarchy).
An objection raised by the Parsimonious Position objection applies here: The taxonomy i s unbounded toward the bottom: it places one on the slippery slope toward having to deal with the full complexity of semantic meaning. Simply working on the structure of discourse is dicult enough without bringing in the complexity o f s e m a n tic knowledge.
The response: There is no reason to fear the complexity o f a n u n bounded set of terms, whether semantic or not, as long as the terms are well-behaved and subject to a pattern of organization which makes them manageable. A hierarchicalization of the terms in which all the pertinent information about discoursal behavior is captured near the top (which is maximally general, bounded, and well-understood) and not at the bottom (which permits unboundedness and redundancy) presents no threat to computational processing. Each discourse relation simply inherits from its ancestors all necessary processing information, such as cue words and realization constraints, and adds its unique peculiarities, to be used for inference (in parsing) or for planning out a discourse (in generation). Increasing dierentiation of relations, continued until the very nest nuances of meaning are separately represented, need be pursued only to the extent required for any g i v en application. Thus \unbounded" growth of semantic relations is not a problem, as long as they can be subsumed under existing nodes in the taxonomy. 
An Unsatisfactory Solution
-e t c .
-e t c . The top tier of the hierarchy presented the most serious problems, because this is where the differences between the Parsimonious and Proigate positions are made manifest. In an attempt to reconcile the two, the hierarchy in Figure 1 was built. This hierarchy displays a number of desirable features. In particular, the top few levels are strictly bounded: no logical alternatives exist to and , and one level lower, under , following Grosz and Sidner there is no need to use any other relation than and .
In this scheme, one can (and the Parsimonious do) perform discourse analysis and study discourse structure wholly at the level of and , and never use the more semantic relations identied by the Proigate. One is simply not being as specic about the particular interclausal relations that make up the discourse.
However, this taxonomy is unsatisfactory. It is impossible in practise to locate in the hierarchy with certainty most of the relations found necessary by the Proigate. For example, is one of the most generally accepted relations. But is it to be classied as a type of or of ? Depending on the intention of the author, it can function either way; for this relation (and for many others), intentionality and semantic relationship co-constrain the discourse structure. Just as semantic case roles dier from syntactic word class relations, the intentional relations are simply not of the same kind as the discoursal ones and should not be included in the same taxonomization. The taxonomy under this three-way subcategorization is given in Figure 2 . The number associated with each relation indicates the number of dierent researchers who have listed the relation and may b e i n terpreted as a vote of condence in it. The table in the Appendix lists each relation in the hierarchy together with its proposers.
In conjunction with this taxonomizing work, we are currently collecting various attempts to provide precise, formal denitions of these relations, notably from [Sanders et al. 92 In this section we m o t i v ate the top-level classication into three parts by appealing to factors central to text planning: the types of information required to dene and use the relations and the resulting types of illocutionary and perlocutionary eects that the relations have in the discourse.
We dene ideational relations between adjacent segments of material as those relations that express some experience of the world about us and within our imagination, not including the interlocutors.
Based on our taxonomization eorts, we h a ve classied the ideational relations, such a s and its various subtypes, , etc. (see Figure 2) , together, since they are all dened with respect to their semantic properties. For example: 14 ObjectAttribute (9) ElabObject (1) ObjectFunction (3) Set-Member (3) ElabPart Process-
Step (5) Elaboration (12) Whole-Part ( 8 ) ElabGenerality Genl-Specific (15) Abstr-Instance (14) Identification (10) Restatement (11) Summary ( 4 ) Location (6) Time (8) Means (4) Circumstance (4) Manner (4) Instrument (1) ParallelEvent (3) SeqTemporal (6) Sequence (6) SeqSpatial (1) SeqOrdinal (3) Semantic (1) VolCause (1) C/RVol (1) VolResult ( 2 ) Cause/Result (17) C/RNonVol (1) NonVolCause (1) Purpose (8) NonVolResult ( 2 ) Condition (9) GeneralCondition (1) Exception (3) Equative (6) Contrast (16) Comparative (1) Otherwise (8) Comparison (3) Analogy (4) Interpretation (3) Evaluation (3) Enablement (10) Background (4) Interpersonal (1) Antithesis (7) Solutionhood (1) Answer (1) Support ( 2 ) Evidence (10) Proof (1) Exhortation Concession (7) Justification (4) Qualification (2) Motivation (7) LogicalRelation Conjunction (6) Presentational (2) PresentationalSeq (1) Disjunction (3) Join (7) 3.2. after \The new Tech Report abstracts are now in the journal area of the library near the abridged dictionary. Please sign your name by any that you would be interested i n seeing."
ibid.
The reader's comprehending the satellite increases his belief of the nucleus.
Comprehending the satellite increases the reader's desire t o p erform the action presented i n the nucleus.
The sequential relationship between the two clauses is cued by the word \when" and by the referential identity of \Ben and \he" and \coee and \it". The temporal (semantic) sequentiality o f the second clause after the rst is given by the fact that Ben's discovery could only occur he poured the coee into the cup. The interclausal relation must be specied in terms of the underlying temporal relationship between the events mentioned in the two c l a u s e s | a s e m a n tic fact about the world.
Given their semantic nature, the use of ideational relations can be determined by means of operations on a knowledge base in a computer. In many instances, relations can be mapped onto knowledge base constructs; for example, the subtype of can be mapped onto or links in conventional knowledge representation formalisms. No explicit reference to a user model or any other external source of knowledge is required.
We dene interpersonal relations as holding between adjacent segments of textual material by which the author attempts to aect the addressee's beliefs, attitudes, desires, etc., by means of language. The perlocutionary eects achieved by these relations are convincing, enabling, motivating, giving evidence, interpreting and evaluating.
We found that relations such a s , all necessarily involve in their denitions the addressee's knowledge, beliefs, or attitudes toward the propositional content of the text. For example,
The enabling relation that holds between the two s e n tences concerns the addressee's knowledge and desire to express his or her interests in certain Tech Reports. It is not possible to dene the interclausal relationship used without reference to the addressee. This essential aspect of interpersonal relations is reected in the Mann and Thompson's denitions ( ) of, say, \There a r e a n u m b er of criteria for distinguishing Ranges from Goals: , t h e R ange cannot be p r obed b y or , whereas the Goal can. , s i n c e nothing is being`done to' it, a Range element never can have a resultative Attribute added within the clause, as a Goal can , t h e R ange cannot be a p ersonal pronoun, and it cannot normally be m o died b y a p ossessive.
, a r ange element (other than one with an`empty' verb like or ) c an often be r ealized a s a p r epositional phrase and under certain conditions it has to be . all Other interpersonal relations, such a s and , m ust be dened in terms of the goals and intentions of the author.
Since the use of interpersonal relations is predicated mainly on the interests, beliefs, and attitudes of the addressee and/or author, relations of this type are usually dened in a computer system with respect to a user model.
We dene textual relations as holding between adjacent segments of text that are not meant t o be directly related ideationally or interpersonally, but whose relationship exists solely due to the juxtaposition imposed by the nature of the presentation medium.
Typically, the \linear" nature of language enforces the use of relations for presentational purposes; examples are and . F or example, the latter is used as follows: Most collections of intersegment discourse relations indiscriminately intermix explicitly presentational relations with ideational and interpersonal ones. This, we b e l i e v e, is due to the fact that intersegment relations play some presentational role in text, which causes a certain amount o f confusion. However, for most relations the presentational function is not primary, and when one is aware of this distinction, the problem is greatly reduced. One major remaining source of diculty is the family, since in English the same cue words and other textual markers are used to signal presentational sequence as semantic sequence. We s o l v e the problem by creating the purely textual relation .
A further reason for distinguishing the three classes is their dierence in illocutionary force. All the ideational relations are expressed by the single illocutionary act , while the interpersonal relations are expressed by v arious perlocutionary acts, including , a n d the long note you play the short ones" the red picture is the blue one" Some nonconclusive evidence supports our organization of the lower portions of the hierarchy, though further study must be done to examine all the relations. This evidence is based on a sensitivity to generalization evinced by m a n y cue words and phrases and syntactic realizations. For example, the cue word \then" is associated with , and can be used appropriately to indicate its subordinates and , as in:
: :
In contrast, the cue words for the two subrelations are specic and cannot be interchanged without introducing the associated connotation: : : Thus the relation associated with \then" subsumes the relations associated with \after" and \be-side". Similar observations hold for a number of the relations, including and .
Preliminary investigation indicates possible additional evidence in the syntactic realization of some relations: When a relation typically gives rise to a dependent clause, then its subrelations tend to do so as well. This surmise requires study by a linguist and is given here as a suggestion. (As is illustrated by t h e w ork of [Martin 91 ], syntactic commonalities between relations typically occur toward the fringes of our taxonomization rather than toward the top.)
A rather gratifying result of the synthesis presented here is that a relatively small number of core relations, organized into three principal types, suce to cover essentially all types of intersegment relations proposed by the sources. This suggests that other relations not yet in the hierarchy a r e likely to be subtypes of relations already in it, preserving the boundedness of the number of relation types.
While we do not claim that discourse structure relations of the type presented in this paper suce to capture all aspects of discourse structure | in particular, they do not convey all aspects of intentionality, as discused by Grosz and Sidner | we b e l i e v e that the relations are a necessary part of any structural description of coherent discourse. The author's intentions, decomposed into the purpose of each discourse segment, co-direct the formation of the discourse together with the ideational, interpersonal, and textual relations. Any a c c o u n t of discourse structure that ignores these types of intersegment relations is incomplete in an important w ay.
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While some evidence is provided for the structure of the hierarchy, w e m a k e no claim that this taxonomy is complete or correct in all details. It is certainly open to elaboration, enhancement, and extension! Our hope is that it will serve the community b y providing a common starting point and straw man for future work on discourse structure. In order to facilitate further investigations of relation denitions, we p r o vide here our crossclassication of our sources' relations (in the left-hand column) and the corresponding relation from our taxonomization (Figure 2 
